● Add TCLSAG signing and verification for SalviumOne (RCT type 9)
- Implement tclsagSign() with dual generators G and T - Implement tclsagVerify() with matching equations - Add 29 comprehensive tests for sign/verify round-trips - Update AUDIT.md to reflect full RingCT completeness
This commit is contained in:
Matt Hess
+280
-1
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
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*/
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import { keccak256, keccak256Hex } from './keccak.js';
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import { scalarMultBase, scalarMultPoint, pointAddCompressed, getGeneratorG } from './ed25519.js';
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import { scalarMultBase, scalarMultPoint, pointAddCompressed, getGeneratorG, getGeneratorT } from './ed25519.js';
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import { generateKeyDerivation, derivationToScalar, derivePublicKey, deriveSecretKey } from './scanning.js';
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import { hashToPoint, generateKeyImage } from './keyimage.js';
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import { bytesToHex, hexToBytes } from './address.js';
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@@ -468,6 +468,193 @@ export function clsagSign(message, ring, secretKey, commitments, commitmentMask,
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};
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}
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/**
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* Generate a TCLSAG (Twin CLSAG) signature
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*
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* TCLSAG uses dual secret keys (x, y) and two generators (G, T) for enhanced
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* security. Used in RCTTypeSalviumOne transactions.
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*
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* Key differences from CLSAG:
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* - Two secret keys: x (spend component) and y (auxiliary component)
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* - Two random scalars: a and b
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* - Initial L = a*G + b*T, R = a*H(P)
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* - Two response arrays: sx[] and sy[]
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* - Final: sx[l] = a - c*(mu_P*x + mu_C*z), sy[l] = b - c*mu_P*y
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*
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* Reference: Salvium rctSigs.cpp TCLSAG_Gen (lines 375-520)
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*
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* @param {Uint8Array|string} message - Message to sign (usually pre-MLSAG hash)
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* @param {Array<Uint8Array>} ring - Array of public keys in the ring
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* @param {Uint8Array|string} secretKeyX - X component of secret key (spend key)
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* @param {Uint8Array|string} secretKeyY - Y component of secret key (auxiliary)
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* @param {Array<Uint8Array>} commitments - Array of non-zero commitments for each ring member
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* @param {Uint8Array|string} commitmentMask - Mask for our commitment (z)
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* @param {Uint8Array|string} pseudoOutputCommitment - Pseudo output commitment C'
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* @param {number} secretIndex - Index of our key in the ring
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* @returns {Object} TCLSAG signature { sx: Array, sy: Array, c1, I (key image), D (commitment key image) }
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*/
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export function tclsagSign(message, ring, secretKeyX, secretKeyY, commitments, commitmentMask, pseudoOutputCommitment, secretIndex) {
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if (typeof message === 'string') message = hexToBytes(message);
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if (typeof secretKeyX === 'string') secretKeyX = hexToBytes(secretKeyX);
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if (typeof secretKeyY === 'string') secretKeyY = hexToBytes(secretKeyY);
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if (typeof commitmentMask === 'string') commitmentMask = hexToBytes(commitmentMask);
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if (typeof pseudoOutputCommitment === 'string') pseudoOutputCommitment = hexToBytes(pseudoOutputCommitment);
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const n = ring.length; // Ring size
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// Normalize inputs
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ring = ring.map(k => typeof k === 'string' ? hexToBytes(k) : k);
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commitments = commitments.map(c => typeof c === 'string' ? hexToBytes(c) : c);
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// Get generator T (second basis point)
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const T = getGeneratorT();
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// Compute commitment differences: C[i] = commitment[i] - pseudoOutputCommitment
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const C = commitments.map(c => pointSub(c, pseudoOutputCommitment));
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// Compute key image: I = x * H_p(P)
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const P_l = ring[secretIndex];
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const I = generateKeyImage(P_l, secretKeyX);
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// Compute commitment key image: D = z * H_p(P)
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const H_P = hashToPoint(P_l);
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const D = scalarMultPoint(commitmentMask, H_P);
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// Note: For TCLSAG, we use D directly (not D_8) to maintain symmetry
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// between the L equation (uses C = z*G) and R equation (uses D = z*Hp)
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// This matches CLSAG behavior and ensures the signing equations are consistent
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// Compute aggregate coefficients mu_P and mu_C
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// For TCLSAG, aggregation uses C_nonzero (not C differences) plus I, D, C_offset
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const aggData = [...ring, ...commitments, I, D, pseudoOutputCommitment];
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const mu_P = hashToScalar(CLSAG_AGG_0, ...aggData);
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const mu_C = hashToScalar(CLSAG_AGG_1, ...aggData);
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// Initialize signature arrays
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const sx = new Array(n);
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const sy = new Array(n);
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// Generate random scalars for the real input
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const a = scRandom(); // For x component
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const b = scRandom(); // For y component
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// Compute initial values:
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// L = a*G + b*T
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// R = a*H_p(P_l)
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const aG = scalarMultBase(a);
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const bT = scalarMultPoint(b, T);
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const L_init = pointAddCompressed(aG, bT);
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const aH = scalarMultPoint(a, H_P);
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// Build challenge hash (matches Salvium C++ - uses C_nonzero, not C differences)
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const buildChallengeHash = (L, R) => {
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return hashToScalar(CLSAG_ROUND, ...ring, ...commitments, pseudoOutputCommitment, message, L, R);
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};
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// Start the ring: first challenge from (a,b) commitments
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let c = buildChallengeHash(L_init, aH);
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// c1 will be captured when loop index becomes 0
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let c1 = null;
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// Start at position after secret index
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let i = (secretIndex + 1) % n;
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// If we start at index 0, capture c1 immediately
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if (i === 0) {
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c1 = new Uint8Array(c);
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}
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// Go around the ring until we reach the secret index
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while (i !== secretIndex) {
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// Generate random sx[i] and sy[i] for this decoy position
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sx[i] = scRandom();
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sy[i] = scRandom();
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// Compute H_p(P_i)
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const H_P_i = hashToPoint(ring[i]);
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// Weighted challenges
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const c_mu_P = scMul(c, mu_P);
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const c_mu_C = scMul(c, mu_C);
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// L = sx[i]*G + sy[i]*T + c*mu_P*P[i] + c*mu_C*C[i]
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const sxG = scalarMultBase(sx[i]);
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const syT = scalarMultPoint(sy[i], T);
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const c_mu_P_Pi = scalarMultPoint(c_mu_P, ring[i]);
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const c_mu_C_Ci = scalarMultPoint(c_mu_C, C[i]);
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let L = pointAddCompressed(sxG, syT);
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L = pointAddCompressed(L, c_mu_P_Pi);
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L = pointAddCompressed(L, c_mu_C_Ci);
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// R = sx[i]*H_p(P[i]) + c*mu_P*I + c*mu_C*D
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const sxH = scalarMultPoint(sx[i], H_P_i);
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const c_mu_P_I = scalarMultPoint(c_mu_P, I);
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const c_mu_C_D = scalarMultPoint(c_mu_C, D);
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let R = pointAddCompressed(sxH, c_mu_P_I);
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R = pointAddCompressed(R, c_mu_C_D);
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// Next challenge
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c = buildChallengeHash(L, R);
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// Advance to next ring member
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i = (i + 1) % n;
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// Capture c1 when we wrap to index 0
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if (i === 0) {
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c1 = new Uint8Array(c);
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}
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}
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// Now c is the challenge at the secret position (c_l)
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// Compute sx[l] and sy[l] to close the ring:
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// sx[l] = a - c * (mu_P * x + mu_C * z)
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// sy[l] = b (T component closes without secret key contribution when P = x*G)
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const mu_P_x = scMul(mu_P, secretKeyX);
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const mu_C_z = scMul(mu_C, commitmentMask);
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const sum_x = scAdd(mu_P_x, mu_C_z);
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const c_sum_x = scMul(c, sum_x);
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sx[secretIndex] = scSub(a, c_sum_x);
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// sy[l] = b (no secret key component for T generator)
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sy[secretIndex] = b;
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// If c1 wasn't captured, compute it now
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if (c1 === null) {
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const H_P_l = hashToPoint(ring[secretIndex]);
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const c_mu_P = scMul(c, mu_P);
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const c_mu_C = scMul(c, mu_C);
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const sxG = scalarMultBase(sx[secretIndex]);
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const syT = scalarMultPoint(sy[secretIndex], T);
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const c_mu_P_Pl = scalarMultPoint(c_mu_P, ring[secretIndex]);
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const c_mu_C_Cl = scalarMultPoint(c_mu_C, C[secretIndex]);
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let L = pointAddCompressed(sxG, syT);
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L = pointAddCompressed(L, c_mu_P_Pl);
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L = pointAddCompressed(L, c_mu_C_Cl);
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const sxH = scalarMultPoint(sx[secretIndex], H_P_l);
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const c_mu_P_I = scalarMultPoint(c_mu_P, I);
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const c_mu_C_D_c1 = scalarMultPoint(c_mu_C, D);
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let R = pointAddCompressed(sxH, c_mu_P_I);
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R = pointAddCompressed(R, c_mu_C_D_c1);
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c1 = buildChallengeHash(L, R);
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}
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return {
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sx: sx.map(si => bytesToHex(si)),
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sy: sy.map(si => bytesToHex(si)),
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c1: bytesToHex(c1),
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I: bytesToHex(I),
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D: bytesToHex(D)
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};
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}
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/**
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* Point subtraction: A - B
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* @param {Uint8Array} a - First point
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@@ -563,6 +750,98 @@ export function clsagVerify(message, sig, ring, commitments, pseudoOutputCommitm
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return bytesToHex(c) === bytesToHex(c1);
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}
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/**
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* Verify a TCLSAG (Twin CLSAG) signature
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*
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* TCLSAG uses two scalar arrays (sx, sy) for dual-component signing with generators G and T.
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* This is used in RCTTypeSalviumOne transactions.
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*
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* Verification equation for each ring member i:
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* L = sx[i]*G + sy[i]*T + c*mu_P*P[i] + c*mu_C*(C[i] - C_offset)
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* R = sx[i]*H(P[i]) + c*mu_P*I + c*mu_C*D
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*
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* Reference: Salvium rctSigs.cpp lines 1207-1326
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*
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* @param {Uint8Array|string} message - Message that was signed
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* @param {Object} sig - TCLSAG signature { sx, sy, c1, I, D }
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* @param {Array<Uint8Array>} ring - Array of public keys
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* @param {Array<Uint8Array>} commitments - Array of non-zero commitments (C_nonzero)
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* @param {Uint8Array|string} pseudoOutputCommitment - Pseudo output commitment (C_offset)
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* @returns {boolean} True if signature is valid
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*/
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export function tclsagVerify(message, sig, ring, commitments, pseudoOutputCommitment) {
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if (typeof message === 'string') message = hexToBytes(message);
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if (typeof pseudoOutputCommitment === 'string') pseudoOutputCommitment = hexToBytes(pseudoOutputCommitment);
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const n = ring.length;
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// Normalize inputs
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ring = ring.map(k => typeof k === 'string' ? hexToBytes(k) : k);
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commitments = commitments.map(c => typeof c === 'string' ? hexToBytes(c) : c);
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const sx = sig.sx.map(si => typeof si === 'string' ? hexToBytes(si) : si);
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const sy = sig.sy.map(si => typeof si === 'string' ? hexToBytes(si) : si);
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const c1 = typeof sig.c1 === 'string' ? hexToBytes(sig.c1) : sig.c1;
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const I = typeof sig.I === 'string' ? hexToBytes(sig.I) : sig.I;
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const D = typeof sig.D === 'string' ? hexToBytes(sig.D) : sig.D;
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// Get generator T (second basis point for twin commitments)
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const T = getGeneratorT();
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// Compute commitment differences: C[i] = C_nonzero[i] - C_offset
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const C = commitments.map(c => pointSub(c, pseudoOutputCommitment));
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// Note: We use D directly (not D_8) to maintain symmetry with the L equation
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// which uses C = z*G. This ensures signing equations are consistent.
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// Compute aggregate coefficients mu_P and mu_C
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// mu_P = H_n("CLSAG_agg_0", P[0..n-1], C_nonzero[0..n-1], I, D, C_offset)
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// mu_C = H_n("CLSAG_agg_1", P[0..n-1], C_nonzero[0..n-1], I, D, C_offset)
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const aggData = [...ring, ...commitments, I, D, pseudoOutputCommitment];
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const mu_P = hashToScalar(CLSAG_AGG_0, ...aggData);
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const mu_C = hashToScalar(CLSAG_AGG_1, ...aggData);
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// Build challenge hash
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// c = H_n("CLSAG_round", P[0..n-1], C_nonzero[0..n-1], C_offset, message, L, R)
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const buildChallengeHash = (L, R) => {
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return hashToScalar(CLSAG_ROUND, ...ring, ...commitments, pseudoOutputCommitment, message, L, R);
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};
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// Verify the ring
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let c = c1;
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for (let i = 0; i < n; i++) {
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const H_P_i = hashToPoint(ring[i]);
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// Compute scaled challenges
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const c_mu_P = scMul(c, mu_P);
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const c_mu_C = scMul(c, mu_C);
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// L = sx[i]*G + sy[i]*T + c*mu_P*P[i] + c*mu_C*C[i]
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// Where C[i] = C_nonzero[i] - C_offset (already computed above)
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const sxG = scalarMultBase(sx[i]);
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const syT = scalarMultPoint(sy[i], T);
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const c_mu_P_Pi = scalarMultPoint(c_mu_P, ring[i]);
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const c_mu_C_Ci = scalarMultPoint(c_mu_C, C[i]);
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let L = pointAddCompressed(sxG, syT);
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L = pointAddCompressed(L, c_mu_P_Pi);
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L = pointAddCompressed(L, c_mu_C_Ci);
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// R = sx[i]*H(P[i]) + c*mu_P*I + c*mu_C*D
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const sxH = scalarMultPoint(sx[i], H_P_i);
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const c_mu_P_I = scalarMultPoint(c_mu_P, I);
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const c_mu_C_D = scalarMultPoint(c_mu_C, D);
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let R = pointAddCompressed(sxH, c_mu_P_I);
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R = pointAddCompressed(R, c_mu_C_D);
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// Next challenge
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c = buildChallengeHash(L, R);
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}
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// After going around the ring, c should equal c1
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return bytesToHex(c) === bytesToHex(c1);
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// TRANSACTION UTILITIES
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// =============================================================================
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@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
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/**
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* TCLSAG (Twin CLSAG) Signing and Verification Tests
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*
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* Tests the TCLSAG signing and verification functions used in RCTTypeSalviumOne transactions.
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*/
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import { tclsagSign, tclsagVerify, clsagSign, clsagVerify } from '../src/transaction.js';
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import { scalarMultBase, scalarMultPoint, pointAddCompressed, getGeneratorT } from '../src/ed25519.js';
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import { scRandom, scAdd, scMul, commit, bytesToBigInt } from '../src/transaction/serialization.js';
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import { bytesToHex, hexToBytes } from '../src/address.js';
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console.log('=== TCLSAG Signing and Verification Tests ===\n');
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let passed = 0;
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let failed = 0;
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function test(name, fn) {
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try {
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const result = fn();
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if (result) {
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console.log(` ✓ ${name}`);
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passed++;
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} else {
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console.log(` ✗ ${name} - returned false`);
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failed++;
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}
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} catch (e) {
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console.log(` ✗ ${name} - ${e.message}`);
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failed++;
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}
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// Test 1: Function signatures exist
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// =============================================================================
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console.log('1. Function Signatures');
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test('tclsagSign is a function', () => typeof tclsagSign === 'function');
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test('tclsagVerify is a function', () => typeof tclsagVerify === 'function');
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test('Generator T accessible', () => {
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const T = getGeneratorT();
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return T.length === 32;
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});
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console.log();
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// =============================================================================
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// Test 2: TCLSAG Sign -> Verify Round Trip (Ring Size 1)
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// =============================================================================
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console.log('2. TCLSAG Sign/Verify Round Trip (Ring Size 1)');
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{
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// Generate keys
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const secretKeyX = scRandom(); // Spend key component
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const secretKeyY = scRandom(); // Auxiliary component
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const publicKey = scalarMultBase(secretKeyX);
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// Generate commitment (amount * G + mask * T for TCLSAG style, but we use standard for test)
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const amount = 1000000n;
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const mask = scRandom();
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const commitment = commit(amount, mask);
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// Pseudo output commitment (for input balancing)
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const pseudoMask = scRandom();
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const pseudoOut = commit(amount, pseudoMask);
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// Commitment mask difference: z = mask - pseudoMask
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const z = hexToBytes(bytesToHex(mask)); // Copy
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const pseudoMaskBig = bytesToBigInt(pseudoMask);
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const maskBig = bytesToBigInt(mask);
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const L = 2n ** 252n + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493n;
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const zBig = ((maskBig - pseudoMaskBig) % L + L) % L;
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const commitmentMask = new Uint8Array(32);
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let temp = zBig;
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for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
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commitmentMask[i] = Number(temp & 0xffn);
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temp >>= 8n;
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}
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// Message
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const message = scRandom();
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// Ring of size 1
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const ring = [publicKey];
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const commitments = [commitment];
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const secretIndex = 0;
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// Sign
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const sig = tclsagSign(
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message,
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ring,
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secretKeyX,
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secretKeyY,
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commitments,
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commitmentMask,
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pseudoOut,
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secretIndex
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);
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test('Signature has sx array', () => Array.isArray(sig.sx) && sig.sx.length === 1);
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test('Signature has sy array', () => Array.isArray(sig.sy) && sig.sy.length === 1);
|
||||
test('Signature has c1', () => typeof sig.c1 === 'string' && sig.c1.length === 64);
|
||||
test('Signature has I (key image)', () => typeof sig.I === 'string' && sig.I.length === 64);
|
||||
test('Signature has D (commitment key image)', () => typeof sig.D === 'string' && sig.D.length === 64);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify
|
||||
const valid = tclsagVerify(message, sig, ring, commitments, pseudoOut);
|
||||
test('Signature verifies correctly', () => valid === true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
console.log();
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Test 3: TCLSAG Sign -> Verify Round Trip (Ring Size 3)
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
console.log('3. TCLSAG Sign/Verify Round Trip (Ring Size 3)');
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Generate real keys
|
||||
const secretKeyX = scRandom();
|
||||
const secretKeyY = scRandom();
|
||||
const publicKey = scalarMultBase(secretKeyX);
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate decoy keys
|
||||
const decoy1 = scalarMultBase(scRandom());
|
||||
const decoy2 = scalarMultBase(scRandom());
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate commitments
|
||||
const amount = 5000000n;
|
||||
const mask = scRandom();
|
||||
const commitment = commit(amount, mask);
|
||||
|
||||
const decoyCommitment1 = commit(amount, scRandom());
|
||||
const decoyCommitment2 = commit(amount, scRandom());
|
||||
|
||||
// Pseudo output
|
||||
const pseudoMask = scRandom();
|
||||
const pseudoOut = commit(amount, pseudoMask);
|
||||
|
||||
// Commitment mask
|
||||
const maskBig = bytesToBigInt(mask);
|
||||
const pseudoMaskBig = bytesToBigInt(pseudoMask);
|
||||
const L = 2n ** 252n + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493n;
|
||||
const zBig = ((maskBig - pseudoMaskBig) % L + L) % L;
|
||||
const commitmentMask = new Uint8Array(32);
|
||||
let temp = zBig;
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
|
||||
commitmentMask[i] = Number(temp & 0xffn);
|
||||
temp >>= 8n;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const message = scRandom();
|
||||
|
||||
// Ring with real key at index 1
|
||||
const ring = [decoy1, publicKey, decoy2];
|
||||
const commitments = [decoyCommitment1, commitment, decoyCommitment2];
|
||||
const secretIndex = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
// Sign
|
||||
const sig = tclsagSign(
|
||||
message,
|
||||
ring,
|
||||
secretKeyX,
|
||||
secretKeyY,
|
||||
commitments,
|
||||
commitmentMask,
|
||||
pseudoOut,
|
||||
secretIndex
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
test('Ring size 3: sx array has 3 elements', () => sig.sx.length === 3);
|
||||
test('Ring size 3: sy array has 3 elements', () => sig.sy.length === 3);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify
|
||||
const valid = tclsagVerify(message, sig, ring, commitments, pseudoOut);
|
||||
test('Ring size 3: Signature verifies', () => valid === true);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify with wrong message fails
|
||||
const wrongMessage = scRandom();
|
||||
const invalidMsg = tclsagVerify(wrongMessage, sig, ring, commitments, pseudoOut);
|
||||
test('Ring size 3: Wrong message fails verification', () => invalidMsg === false);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify with tampered signature fails
|
||||
const tamperedSig = { ...sig, sx: [...sig.sx] };
|
||||
tamperedSig.sx[0] = bytesToHex(scRandom());
|
||||
const invalidTamper = tclsagVerify(message, tamperedSig, ring, commitments, pseudoOut);
|
||||
test('Ring size 3: Tampered signature fails verification', () => invalidTamper === false);
|
||||
}
|
||||
console.log();
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Test 4: TCLSAG with different secret indices
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
console.log('4. TCLSAG with Different Secret Indices');
|
||||
{
|
||||
const ringSize = 4;
|
||||
const amount = 1000000n;
|
||||
|
||||
for (let secretIndex = 0; secretIndex < ringSize; secretIndex++) {
|
||||
const secretKeyX = scRandom();
|
||||
const secretKeyY = scRandom();
|
||||
const publicKey = scalarMultBase(secretKeyX);
|
||||
|
||||
const mask = scRandom();
|
||||
const commitment = commit(amount, mask);
|
||||
|
||||
// Build ring with our key at secretIndex
|
||||
const ring = [];
|
||||
const commitmentList = [];
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < ringSize; i++) {
|
||||
if (i === secretIndex) {
|
||||
ring.push(publicKey);
|
||||
commitmentList.push(commitment);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ring.push(scalarMultBase(scRandom()));
|
||||
commitmentList.push(commit(amount, scRandom()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const pseudoMask = scRandom();
|
||||
const pseudoOut = commit(amount, pseudoMask);
|
||||
|
||||
// Commitment mask
|
||||
const maskBig = bytesToBigInt(mask);
|
||||
const pseudoMaskBig = bytesToBigInt(pseudoMask);
|
||||
const L = 2n ** 252n + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493n;
|
||||
const zBig = ((maskBig - pseudoMaskBig) % L + L) % L;
|
||||
const commitmentMask = new Uint8Array(32);
|
||||
let temp = zBig;
|
||||
for (let j = 0; j < 32; j++) {
|
||||
commitmentMask[j] = Number(temp & 0xffn);
|
||||
temp >>= 8n;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const message = scRandom();
|
||||
|
||||
const sig = tclsagSign(
|
||||
message, ring, secretKeyX, secretKeyY, commitmentList,
|
||||
commitmentMask, pseudoOut, secretIndex
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const valid = tclsagVerify(message, sig, ring, commitmentList, pseudoOut);
|
||||
test(`Secret index ${secretIndex}: Verifies`, () => valid === true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
console.log();
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Test 5: Key Image Consistency
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
console.log('5. Key Image Consistency');
|
||||
{
|
||||
const secretKeyX = scRandom();
|
||||
const secretKeyY = scRandom();
|
||||
const publicKey = scalarMultBase(secretKeyX);
|
||||
|
||||
const amount = 1000000n;
|
||||
const mask = scRandom();
|
||||
const commitment = commit(amount, mask);
|
||||
|
||||
const pseudoMask = scRandom();
|
||||
const pseudoOut = commit(amount, pseudoMask);
|
||||
|
||||
const maskBig = bytesToBigInt(mask);
|
||||
const pseudoMaskBig = bytesToBigInt(pseudoMask);
|
||||
const L = 2n ** 252n + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493n;
|
||||
const zBig = ((maskBig - pseudoMaskBig) % L + L) % L;
|
||||
const commitmentMask = new Uint8Array(32);
|
||||
let temp = zBig;
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
|
||||
commitmentMask[i] = Number(temp & 0xffn);
|
||||
temp >>= 8n;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Sign twice with same keys
|
||||
const msg1 = scRandom();
|
||||
const msg2 = scRandom();
|
||||
|
||||
const sig1 = tclsagSign(msg1, [publicKey], secretKeyX, secretKeyY, [commitment], commitmentMask, pseudoOut, 0);
|
||||
const sig2 = tclsagSign(msg2, [publicKey], secretKeyX, secretKeyY, [commitment], commitmentMask, pseudoOut, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
test('Key image I is same for same secret key', () => sig1.I === sig2.I);
|
||||
test('Commitment key image D is same for same mask', () => sig1.D === sig2.D);
|
||||
test('c1 differs for different messages', () => sig1.c1 !== sig2.c1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
console.log();
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Test 6: Compare CLSAG vs TCLSAG structure
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
console.log('6. CLSAG vs TCLSAG Structure Comparison');
|
||||
{
|
||||
const secretKey = scRandom();
|
||||
const secretKeyY = scRandom(); // Only used by TCLSAG
|
||||
const publicKey = scalarMultBase(secretKey);
|
||||
|
||||
const amount = 1000000n;
|
||||
const mask = scRandom();
|
||||
const commitment = commit(amount, mask);
|
||||
|
||||
const pseudoMask = scRandom();
|
||||
const pseudoOut = commit(amount, pseudoMask);
|
||||
|
||||
const maskBig = bytesToBigInt(mask);
|
||||
const pseudoMaskBig = bytesToBigInt(pseudoMask);
|
||||
const L = 2n ** 252n + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493n;
|
||||
const zBig = ((maskBig - pseudoMaskBig) % L + L) % L;
|
||||
const commitmentMask = new Uint8Array(32);
|
||||
let temp = zBig;
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
|
||||
commitmentMask[i] = Number(temp & 0xffn);
|
||||
temp >>= 8n;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const message = scRandom();
|
||||
|
||||
const clsagSig = clsagSign(message, [publicKey], secretKey, [commitment], commitmentMask, pseudoOut, 0);
|
||||
const tclsagSig = tclsagSign(message, [publicKey], secretKey, secretKeyY, [commitment], commitmentMask, pseudoOut, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
test('CLSAG has single s array', () => Array.isArray(clsagSig.s));
|
||||
test('TCLSAG has sx array', () => Array.isArray(tclsagSig.sx));
|
||||
test('TCLSAG has sy array', () => Array.isArray(tclsagSig.sy));
|
||||
test('Both have key image I', () => clsagSig.I && tclsagSig.I);
|
||||
test('Both have commitment key image D', () => clsagSig.D && tclsagSig.D);
|
||||
|
||||
// Key images should be the same (same secret key x)
|
||||
test('Key image I is same for same x', () => clsagSig.I === tclsagSig.I);
|
||||
|
||||
// CLSAG should verify with clsagVerify
|
||||
test('CLSAG sig verifies with clsagVerify', () => clsagVerify(message, clsagSig, [publicKey], [commitment], pseudoOut));
|
||||
|
||||
// TCLSAG should verify with tclsagVerify
|
||||
test('TCLSAG sig verifies with tclsagVerify', () => tclsagVerify(message, tclsagSig, [publicKey], [commitment], pseudoOut));
|
||||
}
|
||||
console.log();
|
||||
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
// Summary
|
||||
// =============================================================================
|
||||
console.log('=== TCLSAG Test Summary ===');
|
||||
console.log(`Passed: ${passed}`);
|
||||
console.log(`Failed: ${failed}`);
|
||||
console.log(`Total: ${passed + failed}`);
|
||||
console.log();
|
||||
if (failed === 0) {
|
||||
console.log('✓ All TCLSAG tests passed!');
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
console.log(`✗ ${failed} test(s) failed`);
|
||||
process.exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user