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Security fixes (#48)

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* unify tx versions; add missing protocol tx checks

* fixed errors with protocol_tx handling pre-Carrot

* fixed error caused by setting coinbase_tx version to 4

* fix eph pubkey check for protocol tx verification

* Update tx_pool.cpp

---------

Co-authored-by: Some Random Crypto Guy <somerandomcryptoguy@protonmail.com>
Co-authored-by: somerandomcryptoguy <139346562+somerandomcryptoguy@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
akildemir
2025-08-20 17:26:36 +03:00
committed by GitHub
parent 40f0420e02
commit b2ab2f606c
6 changed files with 41 additions and 16 deletions
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src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp
+37 -7
View File
@@ -1348,6 +1348,11 @@ bool Blockchain::prevalidate_miner_transaction(const block& b, uint64_t height,
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(b.miner_tx.vin[0].type() == typeid(txin_gen), false, "coinbase transaction in the block has the wrong type");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(b.miner_tx.version > 1, false, "Invalid coinbase transaction version");
if (hf_version >= HF_VERSION_CARROT) {
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(b.miner_tx.version == TRANSACTION_VERSION_CARROT, false, "miner transaction has wrong version");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(b.miner_tx.type == cryptonote::transaction_type::MINER, false, "miner transaction has wrong type");
}
// for v2 txes (ringct), we only accept empty rct signatures for miner transactions,
if (hf_version >= HF_VERSION_REJECT_SIGS_IN_COINBASE && b.miner_tx.version >= 2)
{
@@ -1398,6 +1403,11 @@ bool Blockchain::prevalidate_protocol_transaction(const block& b, uint64_t heigh
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(b.protocol_tx.vin[0].type() == typeid(txin_gen), false, "coinbase protocol transaction in the block has the wrong type");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(b.protocol_tx.version > 1, false, "Invalid coinbase protocol transaction version");
if (hf_version >= HF_VERSION_CARROT) {
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(b.protocol_tx.version == TRANSACTION_VERSION_CARROT, false, "protocol transaction has wrong version");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(b.protocol_tx.type == cryptonote::transaction_type::PROTOCOL, false, "protocol transaction has wrong type");
}
// for v2 txes (ringct), we only accept empty rct signatures for protocol transactions,
if (hf_version >= HF_VERSION_REJECT_SIGS_IN_COINBASE && b.protocol_tx.version >= 2)
{
@@ -1621,7 +1631,7 @@ bool Blockchain::validate_protocol_transaction(const block& b, uint64_t height,
);
if (hf_version >= HF_VERSION_CARROT) {
// TODO: add other verifications for carrot yield payouts
size_t output_idx = 0;
for (auto it = carrot_yield_payouts.begin(); it != carrot_yield_payouts.end(); it++, output_idx++) {
// Verify the output key
@@ -1629,6 +1639,16 @@ bool Blockchain::validate_protocol_transaction(const block& b, uint64_t height,
cryptonote::get_output_public_key(b.protocol_tx.vout[output_idx], out_key);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(out_key == it->first.return_address, false, "Incorrect output key detected in protocol_tx");
// Verify the return pubkey
if (b.protocol_tx.vout.size() > 1) {
const auto additional_pubkeys = cryptonote::get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra(b.protocol_tx.extra);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(additional_pubkeys.size() > output_idx, false, "Missing return pubkey detected in protocol_tx");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(additional_pubkeys[output_idx] == it->first.return_pubkey, false, "Incorrect return pubkey detected in protocol_tx");
} else {
const auto main_pubkey = cryptonote::get_tx_pub_key_from_extra(b.protocol_tx.extra);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(main_pubkey == it->first.return_pubkey, false, "Incorrect return pubkey detected in protocol_tx");
}
// Verify the output amount
uint64_t expected_amount = it->second;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(b.protocol_tx.vout[output_idx].amount == expected_amount, false, "Incorrect output amount detected in protocol_tx. expected_amount: " << expected_amount);
@@ -1636,11 +1656,21 @@ bool Blockchain::validate_protocol_transaction(const block& b, uint64_t height,
// Verify the output asset type
std::string out_asset_type;
cryptonote::get_output_asset_type(b.protocol_tx.vout[output_idx], out_asset_type);
uint8_t hf_yield = m_hardfork->get_ideal_version(it->first.block_height);
if (hf_yield >= HF_VERSION_SALVIUM_ONE_PROOFS)
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(out_asset_type == "SAL1", false, "Incorrect output asset_type (!= SAL1) detected in protocol_tx");
else
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(out_asset_type == "SAL", false, "Incorrect output asset_type (!= SAL) detected in protocol_tx");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(out_asset_type == "SAL1", false, "Incorrect output asset_type (!= SAL1) detected in protocol_tx");
// Verify the view tag
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(
boost::get<cryptonote::txout_to_carrot_v1>(
b.protocol_tx.vout[output_idx].target
).view_tag == it->first.return_view_tag, false, "Incorrect view tag detected in protocol_tx"
);
// Verify the anchor encrypted
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(
boost::get<cryptonote::txout_to_carrot_v1>(
b.protocol_tx.vout[output_idx].target
).encrypted_janus_anchor == it->first.return_anchor_enc, false, "Incorrect anchor detected in protocol_tx"
);
}
return true;
@@ -3685,7 +3715,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_outputs(const transaction& tx, tx_verification_context
*/
if (hf_version >= HF_VERSION_CARROT) {
// from v11, force the new SalviumOne RCT data
// from v10, force the new SalviumOne RCT data
if (tx.type == cryptonote::transaction_type::TRANSFER || tx.type == cryptonote::transaction_type::STAKE || tx.type == cryptonote::transaction_type::BURN || tx.type == cryptonote::transaction_type::CONVERT || tx.type == cryptonote::transaction_type::AUDIT) {
if (tx.rct_signatures.type != rct::RCTTypeSalviumOne) {
MERROR_VER("SalviumOne data required after v" + std::to_string(HF_VERSION_CARROT));