update unbound, fix unbound openssl issue on OS X
This commit is contained in:
+31
-21
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ trust (very large) TTL values.
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.TP
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.B cache\-min\-ttl: \fI<seconds>
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Time to live minimum for RRsets and messages in the cache. Default is 0.
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If the the minimum kicks in, the data is cached for longer than the domain
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If the minimum kicks in, the data is cached for longer than the domain
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owner intended, and thus less queries are made to look up the data.
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Zero makes sure the data in the cache is as the domain owner intended,
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higher values, especially more than an hour or so, can lead to trouble as
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@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ The public key certificate pem file for the ssl service. Default is "",
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turned off.
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.TP
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.B ssl\-port: \fI<number>
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The port number on which to provide TCP SSL service, default 443, only
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The port number on which to provide TCP SSL service, default 853, only
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interfaces configured with that port number as @number get the SSL service.
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.TP
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.B do\-daemonize: \fI<yes or no>
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@@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ a daemon. Default is yes.
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The netblock is given as an IP4 or IP6 address with /size appended for a
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classless network block. The action can be \fIdeny\fR, \fIrefuse\fR,
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\fIallow\fR, \fIallow_snoop\fR, \fIdeny_non_local\fR or \fIrefuse_non_local\fR.
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The most specific netblock match is used, if none match \fIdeny\fR is used.
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.IP
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The action \fIdeny\fR stops queries from hosts from that netblock.
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.IP
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@@ -443,6 +444,8 @@ requires privileges, then a reload will fail; a restart is needed.
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.TP
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.B directory: \fI<directory>
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Sets the working directory for the program. Default is "@UNBOUND_RUN_DIR@".
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On Windows the string "%EXECUTABLE%" tries to change to the directory
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that unbound.exe resides in.
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.TP
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.B logfile: \fI<filename>
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If "" is given, logging goes to stderr, or nowhere once daemonized.
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@@ -480,7 +483,7 @@ kill \-HUP `cat @UNBOUND_PIDFILE@`
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.fi
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triggers a reload,
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.nf
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kill \-QUIT `cat @UNBOUND_PIDFILE@`
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kill \-TERM `cat @UNBOUND_PIDFILE@`
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.fi
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gracefully terminates.
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.TP
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@@ -567,7 +570,7 @@ to increase the max depth that is checked to.
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.B harden\-algo\-downgrade: \fI<yes or no>
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Harden against algorithm downgrade when multiple algorithms are
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advertised in the DS record. If no, allows the weakest algorithm to
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validate the zone. Default is yes. Zone signers must produce zones
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validate the zone. Default is no. Zone signers must produce zones
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that allow this feature to work, but sometimes they do not, and turning
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this option off avoids that validation failure.
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.TP
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@@ -584,23 +587,30 @@ queries. For domains that do not support 0x20 and also fail with fallback
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because they keep sending different answers, like some load balancers.
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Can be given multiple times, for different domains.
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.TP
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.B qname\-minimisation: \fI<yes or no>
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Send minimum amount of information to upstream servers to enhance privacy.
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Only sent minimum required labels of the QNAME and set QTYPE to NS when
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possible. Best effort approach, full QNAME and original QTYPE will be sent when
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upstream replies with a RCODE other than NOERROR. Default is off.
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.TP
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.B private\-address: \fI<IP address or subnet>
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Give IPv4 of IPv6 addresses or classless subnets. These are addresses
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on your private network, and are not allowed to be returned for public
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internet names. Any occurence of such addresses are removed from
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DNS answers. Additionally, the DNSSEC validator may mark the answers
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bogus. This protects against so\-called DNS Rebinding, where a user browser
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is turned into a network proxy, allowing remote access through the browser
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to other parts of your private network. Some names can be allowed to
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contain your private addresses, by default all the \fBlocal\-data\fR
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that you configured is allowed to, and you can specify additional
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names using \fBprivate\-domain\fR. No private addresses are enabled
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by default. We consider to enable this for the RFC1918 private IP
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address space by default in later releases. That would enable private
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addresses for 10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16 169.254.0.0/16
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fd00::/8 and fe80::/10, since the RFC standards say these addresses
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should not be visible on the public internet. Turning on 127.0.0.0/8
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would hinder many spamblocklists as they use that.
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on your private network, and are not allowed to be returned for
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public internet names. Any occurrence of such addresses are removed
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from DNS answers. Additionally, the DNSSEC validator may mark the
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answers bogus. This protects against so\-called DNS Rebinding, where
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a user browser is turned into a network proxy, allowing remote access
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through the browser to other parts of your private network. Some names
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can be allowed to contain your private addresses, by default all the
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\fBlocal\-data\fR that you configured is allowed to, and you can specify
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additional names using \fBprivate\-domain\fR. No private addresses are
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enabled by default. We consider to enable this for the RFC1918 private
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IP address space by default in later releases. That would enable private
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addresses for 10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16 169.254.0.0/16
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fd00::/8 and fe80::/10, since the RFC standards say these addresses
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should not be visible on the public internet. Turning on 127.0.0.0/8
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would hinder many spamblocklists as they use that. Adding ::ffff:0:0/96
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stops IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses from bypassing the filter.
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.TP
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.B private\-domain: \fI<domain name>
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Allow this domain, and all its subdomains to contain private addresses.
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@@ -745,7 +755,7 @@ Instruct the validator to remove data from the additional section of secure
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messages that are not signed properly. Messages that are insecure, bogus,
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indeterminate or unchecked are not affected. Default is yes. Use this setting
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to protect the users that rely on this validator for authentication from
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protentially bad data in the additional section.
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potentially bad data in the additional section.
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.TP
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.B val\-log\-level: \fI<number>
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Have the validator print validation failures to the log. Regardless of
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@@ -1032,7 +1042,7 @@ If set to 0, all queries are dropped for domains where the limit is
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exceeded. If set to another value, 1 in that number is allowed through
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to complete. Default is 10, allowing 1/10 traffic to flow normally.
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This can make ordinary queries complete (if repeatedly queried for),
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and enter the cache, whilst also mitigiting the traffic flow by the
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and enter the cache, whilst also mitigating the traffic flow by the
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factor given.
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.TP 5
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.B ratelimit\-for\-domain: \fI<domain> <number qps>
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